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Abstract: The Cost Recovery Principle (CRP) is considered by the European Union (EU) water policy
as a substantial requirement for economic efficiency, transparency, fairness, and sustainability in
the use of water resources. Nevertheless, the implementation of the CRP by EU Member States has
encountered significant challenges, both theoretical and practical, especially regarding the accounting
of environmental and resource costs related to water use by the agricultural sector. This paper aims
to analyse the application of the CRP to the agricultural irrigation sector in Spain, based on the case
study of the Guadalquivir River Basin. To this end, an assessment of the financial, environmental,
and resource costs (and the corresponding cost recovery rates) of water services related to the
irrigation sector was carried out for this specific river basin. Additionally, this study aimed to offer a
much-needed discussion on the agricultural “exceptionalism” phenomenon regarding the application
of the CRP at the moment when water and agricultural EU policies are being reviewed to guarantee a
more sustainable development of agriculture when using such a strategic natural resource.
Keywords: irrigated agriculture; cost recovery principle; environmental cost; resource cost; water
pricing; Spain
1. Introduction
Irrigated agriculture constitutes the main user of water resources in Europe [1], although water
costs in this sector remain generally low or negligible in comparison to those supported by other
water-service users [2]. This mismatch leads to allocative and equity inefficiencies [3], as water prices
lose their potential to inform irrigators about the complete cost of their water consumption and the
external costs of their activities, such as the deterioration of water quality [4]. In this respect, the Cost
Recovery Principle (CRP) is considered by the European Union (EU) water policy as a substantial
requirement for economic efficiency and transparency in the use of water resources [5], but is also
considered for fairness and sustainability reasons [6]. Consequently, most EU Member States (MS)
are making certain advances in reforming their water pricing and financing policies towards higher
cost recovery rates in all water services, including those of the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, these
efforts remain insufficient [3,7]. Additionally, the implementation of the CRP by EU Member States
(MS) has encountered significant challenges, both theoretical and practical, especially regarding the
accounting of environmental and resource costs [8]. Although the analysis of the environmental
external costs associated to agriculture has been addressed by extensive literature (see [9,10], among
others), its evaluation, together with the assessment of resource costs, has been limited [11].
The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2000/60/EC [12] requires all economic costs of water
services to be taken into account as an economic instrument to achieve a “good status” for all bodies of
water. These costs include financial costs (which are basically operation, maintenance, and capital costs
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of water service infrastructure), environmental costs (defined as the costs of environmental damage
imposed by water users, such as agricultural diffuse pollution), and resource costs (representing costs
related to foregone use opportunities due to resource depletion). Nevertheless, existing cost-recovery
data on the agricultural sector at EU level shows that this sector may be contributing insufficiently to
cover the costs associated to its use of water services [3]. This factor, together with other exceptional
treatments such as publicly subsidised modernization of irrigation systems, has led to irrigated
agriculture in Europe (and in other parts of the world) to be described as enjoying exceptional
treatment by governments with respect to other sectors under a presumed social legitimation [13–15].
This study focuses on irrigated agriculture as a water service beneficiary submitted to the fulfilment of
the CRP, as defined by the WFD. Despite the expected reduction in the “exceptional” treatment of the
agricultural sector regarding this principle due to new and reformed legislation in the EU (e.g., debates
regarding forthcoming reforms of the WFD and CAP), which aims to include additional requirements
for agricultural activities regarding both water pricing and internalisation of environmental external
costs [14], further research and public discussion on the fulfilment of EU water policy principles remain
scarce [16].
This study aimed to analyse the application of the CRP to the agricultural irrigation sector in Spain
based on the information available regarding cost recovery in the Spanish River Basin Management
Plans (RBMPs) (second cycle, 2016–2021). Furthermore, the case study of the Guadalquivir River Basin
(GRB) was assessed in detail with the aim of offering an estimation of the financial, environmental,
and resource costs (and corresponding cost recovery rates) based on the information contained in
the last Guadalquivir RBMP [17]. Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand,
it aims to assess the implementation of the CRP in the irrigation sector of the GRB since this case
study constitutes a good example of a closed river basin in a semi-arid region of the Mediterranean.
The GRB has undergone an intense development of irrigated agriculture in recent decades, thereby
imposing significant increasing pressure on available water resources. Furthermore, it is one of the most
important Spanish river basins in terms of size, gross value added (GVA), and agricultural development:
its assessment is therefore expected to be of relevance to other Mediterranean basins in Europe.
On the other hand, it aims to offer a much-needed discussion about the agricultural “exceptionalism”
phenomenon regarding the application of the CRP to used water services, at the moment when water
and agricultural EU policies are being reviewed, to guarantee a more sustainable development of
agriculture when using such a strategic natural resource. At this point, it is worth mentioning that this
paper aims not to take a position in the political debate on agricultural “exceptionalism”, but instead
to contribute towards its analysis and discussion.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the application
of the CRP in the EU and Spanish context. Section 3 analyses the case study of the GRB and offers
an evaluation of the CRP based on the assessment of financial, environmental, and resource costs.
A discussion of the results and their policy implications are offered in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions
are summarised in Section 5.
2. The Application of the CRP in the Irrigation Sector
Before the analysis of the case study of the GRB, this section aims to offer a brief review of the
application of the CRP to the irrigation sector in the EU context, especially in southern EU member
states, and in the Spanish context in particular.
2.1. EU Context
The WFD defines water services as “all services, which provide, for households, public institutions
or any economic activity: (a) Abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and distribution of surface
water or groundwater, (b) Wastewater collection and treatment facilities, which subsequently discharge
into surface water.” (Art.2 [12]). Therefore, water use means water services together with any other
activity having a significant impact on the status of water. In general, water users, such as the
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agricultural sector, include water service beneficiaries, such as irrigated agriculture. Moreover, Article
9 of the WFD clearly obliges MS to “take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water
services, including environmental and resource costs ( . . . ) in accordance with the polluter pays
principle”. Thus, MS must “provide incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, and thereby
contribute to the environmental objectives of the Directive”. Additionally, MS are to ensure an
“adequate contribution of the different water uses, disaggregated into at least industry, household,
and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services”. The implementation of the WFD by MS
has triggered a real shift in the paradigm of European water policy since it positioned the effective
implementation of the CRP as a necessary economic and legal principle to guarantee the achievement
of environmental objectives. In this respect, guidelines to address the CRP in water services and the
use of instruments for cost recovery purposes were also developed [18]. MS should have achieved a
“good” status in all bodies of surface water and groundwater by 2015 unless there were grounds for
derogation. Only in this case may the achievement of good status be extended to 2021, or to 2027 at the
latest. Unfortunately, far from being exceptions, derogations have been the general case in most EU
bodies of water [19,20], whereby the existence of environmental damage caused by the agricultural
sector constitutes one of the main reasons [21,22].
The agricultural contribution towards the cost recovery of water services varies depending
on the country under consideration. Although data remain scarce, Table 1 attempts to show this
heterogeneity among southern EU MS (where irrigated agriculture carries a significant weight as water
user), both regarding cost-recovery (CR) rates (fifth column) and the assessment of environmental
cost (EC) and resource cost (RC) associated to agriculture in the RBMPs (sixth and seventh columns,
respectively).
Table 1. Water provision charges and CR in agriculture for certain EU countries.
Country AgriculturalWithdrawals (% Total) Type of Charge
Average
Irrigation Tariffs CR Rate EC RC
France 1 20
Water tariff (all-in) 0.09 EUR/m3
95% * No No
Water tariff (dual) 80–160 EUR/ha +0.06–0.08 EUR/m3
Spain 2 70
Water tariff (volumetric) 0.064 EUR/m3
62% Yes NoWater fee (flat-rate) 113–470 EUR/ha
Greece 3 87
Water tariff (volumetric) 0.05–0.7 EUR/m3
54% Yes YesWater fee (flat-rate) 90–210 EUR/ha
Italy 1 44
Water tariff (volumetric) 0.04–0.25 EUR/m3
50% Yes NoWater fee (flat-rate) 30–150 EUR/ha
Portugal 1 80
Water tariff (volumetric) 0.002 EUR/m3
23% Yes NoWater fee (flat-rate) 120 EUR/ha
Note: * Includes all sectors. Sources: 1 [23], 2 [17], 3 [24].
The insufficient cost recovery rate achieved in southern EU MS is due to various factors. In this
respect, several studies show that the implementation of the Programme of Measures (PoMs) in river
basin districts (RBDs) across the EU has revealed that transparent implementation of the CRP in the
irrigated agricultural sector is not applied largely due to the lack of metering [24,25] and socio-political
factors [8]. Socio-political factors are normally based on two main arguments: environmental benefits
provided by agriculture (e.g., rural landscape protection and provision of ecosystem services), and
sector competitiveness [16,19]. In this respect, Cornish et al. [26] argued that this lack of political will is
giving wrong signals to farmers as water users and thus endangering the achievement of WFD goals.
For instance, French households consume 24% of billed water and contribute an average of 80% to the
financing of measures aimed at reducing agrochemical pollution in water bodies, whereas agriculture
uses 48% of billed water and contributes barely 2% [27]. Furthermore, even though EU water law
addresses a good number of exemption clauses with respect to the application of the CRP (and other
water policy principles such as the polluter pays principle), the politics of exemptions has been largely
ignored in the literature [16].
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2.2. Spanish Context
The WFD has been incorporated into the Spanish legal framework by Law 62/2003 (and its
subsequent modifications by Law 11/2005 and Royal Decree 4/2007), together with a new Act for
Hydrological Planning (Royal Decree 907/2007) and the Water Planning Instructions (Ministerial
Order ARM/2656/2008). These legal pieces have transposed all EU water policy principles into the
national legal framework, including the CRP as described in the WFD. In most cases, hydrological
planning is a competence of the national government, which is implemented by River Basin Authorities.
Nevertheless, in certain specific cases, such as Catalonian RBs and the Mediterranean Andalusian RB,
development and implementation of water policy has been transferred to regional governments in
fulfilment of legal frameworks of the EU and national water. Recovery cost instruments can thus be
developed by national or regional authorities, or by both levels, depending on each RB. The specific
case of the GRB constitutes an example of centrally managed RB with the RBA (central government) as
the main governing and managing authority.
In a similar way to that of the EU, the Spanish context in terms of agricultural development in
RBDs presents high heterogeneity. The significance of irrigated agriculture is higher in Mediterranean
areas, where the Ebro, Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Jucar, and Segura RBs represent good examples.
Table 2 shows data regarding the importance of the agricultural sector in each of these RBs and across
the whole of Spain. In terms of water use, agriculture constitutes the main user in all RBs (as well as in
Spain, as a whole), although in terms of GVA generation and productivity (EUR/m3), the differences
between the selected RBs are significant depending on the type of crops cultivated and their irrigation
needs. Nevertheless, agricultural water productivity is generally very low compared to that of industry
(131 EUR/m3) and the urban sector (156 EUR/m3) [28].
Table 2. Agricultural water use, GVA and productivity in Spanish RBDs (2012).
Water use GVA Productivity
RBD Hm3 % Total % Total (€/m3)
Ebro 5085 97.2 3.1 0.46
Guadalquivir 3357 88.0 4.8 0.88
Guadiana 1916 89.9 6.2 0.70
Jucar 2581 79.6 2.4 0.84
Segura 1546 86.0 4.6 0.97
Spain 22,181 82.3 2.8 0.94
Source: Authors’ own based on data given in [28].
Following the WATECO guidelines [18], the calculation of financial costs in the case of Spanish
RBDs has been based on the sum of annual operating and maintenance costs, plus an estimation of the
capital cost of irrigation infrastructures in annual terms (through the calculation of equivalent annual
costs (EAC)). Additionally, RBDs are required to assess environmental and resource costs when making
provisions for cost recovery. In this respect, the WATECO guidelines offer a definition of environmental
costs and provided two methods of calculation: the “cost-based” and “benefit-based” approaches.
The cost-based approach relies on determining the amount of expenditure to either maintain or restore
a water body to a “good chemical and ecological status” as established by the WFD. The benefit-based
approach relies on determining the economic value of natural resources. In the case of Spanish RBDs,
and following the guidelines given by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, and Environment,
calculations of environmental costs are obtained on a cost-based approach. The methodology used by
Spanish RBs to assess financial and environmental costs is analysed in detail in Section 4, taking as
example the case study of the GRB. Regarding resource costs, no assessment methods are provided by
the WATECO guidelines, apart from a few definitions and concepts [20,29]. Most Spanish RBs do not
assess any resource costs.
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In 2012, the estimated global cost-recovery rate of water services in agriculture was 0.62 in Spain,
when both financial and environmental costs are accounted for (Table 3). This means a reduction with
respect to the rate achieved in the previous planning cycle, due mainly to high investment in irrigation
modernisation and irrigation efficiency enhancement over the last decade which has been financially
supported by regional and national governments [30]. Moreover, the substitution of groundwater
exploitation by surface or external resources (e.g., desalinization) is also subsidised in most RBs
(such as the Segura RB), and therefore the CRP cannot be adequately applied [31]. Table 3 shows the
estimated CR rates upon data on estimated costs (both financial and environmental) and revenues of
water services in the agricultural sector for selected RBDs in Mediterranean Spain. No resource costs
are considered in the CR assessment. In the case of Spain as a whole, environmental costs represent
20% of total costs, thereby reducing the CR rate from 0.78 to 0.62 when these costs are accounted for.
In terms of each RBD, the case of the GRB shows CR rates above the Spanish average. The Segura
RBD registers the lowest rates, due mainly to the high environmental costs associated to irrigated
agriculture in that particular basin, which registers serious problems involving ecological deterioration
in surface water and groundwater pollution [32].
Table 3. Financial and environmental costs, revenues, and cost-recovery rates in agriculture in Spanish
Mediterranean RBDs.
RBD Financial Costs Environmental Costs Revenues CR Rate 1 CR Rate 2
Ebro 773.5 100.8 630.4 0.82 0.72
Guadalquivir 338.2 55.5 259.1 0.76 0.66
Guadiana 163.5 55.0 130.9 0.80 0.60
Jucar 490.2 56.4 399.1 0.81 0.73
Segura 220.2 141.7 164.3 0.75 0.45
Spain 2950.1 760 2300.2 0.78 0.62
Note: Costs and revenues measured in millions of euros (year 2012). 1 Only financial costs. 2 Financial and
environmental costs. Source: Authors’ own based on [17].
3. Description of the Case-Study
The Guadalquivir River is the longest river in southern Spain, as 650 km in length, with a total
combined length including both the river and its tributaries of around 10,700 km. It has a basin
area of over 57,527 km2, a population of 4.1 million inhabitants, and annual renewable resources
estimated at 7.1 × 109 m3 for surface waters and 2.6 × 109 m3 for groundwater, making it the most
important river basin in southern Spain. The basin area is made up of forests (49.1%), agricultural
land (47.2%), urban areas (1.9%), and wetlands (1.8%). It has a Mediterranean climate with an average
rainfall of 573 mm, occasional periods of prolonged drought, and an average annual temperature
of 16.8 ◦C. The current reservoir capacity in the GRB is 8560 hm3 and the average water use in the
basin amounts to approximately 3800 hm3 per year [17], of which about 3400 hm3 is used to meet
the demands of irrigated agriculture (which represents 88% of the total water demand in the basin).
Water rights are associated to irrigated land ownership, whereby agricultural water use (together with
the rest of the economic uses, such as industry and energy) is granted a lower level of priority than
domestic uses. Agricultural water use basically represents that of irrigation, as water use for livestock
production is around 19 hm3 (a mere 0.01% of the total use of agricultural water in the basin). Therefore,
in subsequent sections, the terms agricultural sector and irrigation sector are used indistinctively.
Currently, the GRB is characterised by a state of closure, where all available water resources are
allocated to increasingly high levels of competing demands and the supply capacity has reached its
maximum [30]. In fact, no further conversions of rain-fed areas to irrigation are permitted (apart from
those with special administrative authorisation). Except for groundwater resources, water is highly
regulated by a total of 65 dams and an inter-basin transfer facility (Negratín-Almanzora) to export
water from the GRB to the Mediterranean Andalusian River Basin for irrigation purposes on the basis
of water trading [33].
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The specific case study of the GRB is particularly relevant within the Spanish context, as it contains
23% of Spain’s total irrigated land [17]. The competitiveness of its irrigated agriculture, which is based
on high-value crops (such as citrus and olive trees), explains the remarkable expansion in irrigated
areas and modernisation of irrigation systems in recent decades, to the point where there are now
approximately 852,000 hectares of irrigated land. This context makes the GRB a very interesting case
study for the analysis of the application of the CRP regarding water services related to the agricultural
sector in the Mediterranean context.
Table 4 summarises the main instruments for cost recovery of water services in the GRB. Up-stream
services are managed by the River Basin Authority (RBA), which is in charge of providing water to
down-stream services (such as irrigation districts). For these services, the RBA applies abstraction
charges designed to finance operational and maintenance costs, as well as investment amortization
costs. Down-stream water services in the agricultural sector are commonly managed by irrigation
districts or irrigation water user associations (IWUAs), which provide water to all their associated
farmers at a fixed (per hectare) or volumetric (per cubic metre) price (Table 4). Most IWUAs have
already implemented volumetric metering, but there are still IWUAs that use fixed charges per hectare.
These charges cover all costs of these IWUAs, including investment and operating costs. They also
collect farmers’ levies charged by the RBA for up-stream services and transfer the revenue to the RBA.
Conversely, the use of groundwater by farmers generally implies no charge per water use, apart from
the administrative licensing cost (in legal abstractions). One exemption is the case of the Fuencaliente
aquifer (within the GRB district), where abstraction charges to groundwater users are applied [34].
Nevertheless, illegal groundwater abstraction is widespread in the GRB and is estimated as being at
1305 hm3 per year (90% of which is used for irrigation purposes). Finally, reused (or recycled) water
represents only 15.4 hm3 (0.5% of total agricultural water use) and these costs are normally recovered
by urban water charges. Total revenues in water services related to irrigated agriculture amount up to
259 million euros (Table 3).
Table 4. Main CR instruments in GRB (2012).
Water Services Instruments Prices
Up-stream services Surface regulated waters
Abstraction charge
“Canon de regulación and
Tarifa de utilización del agua”
0.034 €/m3
Down-stream services
Surface regulated waters Irrigation charge(charged by IWUAs)
0.064 €/m3
262.9 €/ha
Non-regulated and
groundwaters (GW)
No legal charges for water use.
Operating costs supported by users
(Average cost 0.15 €/m3)
Recycled Urban water charges 0.24 €/m3
Source: Authors’ own based on [17].
4. Assessment of the Application of the CRP in the Guadalquivir River Basin
This section aims to offer a detailed assessment of financial, environmental and resource costs
associated to the irrigation sector in the GRB case study. Section 4.1 offers an assessment of the
CR rates regarding financial and environmental costs of water services used by the irrigation sector.
Section 4.2 applies a simple method to estimate the resource cost in the GRB. Finally, CR rates are
assessed following the inclusion of the estimation of resource cost.
4.1. Financial and Environmental Costs
Financial costs associated to the water infrastructures used by the irrigation sector are normally
calculated by means of the monetary valuation of capital costs plus the operational and management
(O&M) costs of that infrastructure. Those costs are converted into an EAC (Equation (1)). Thus, capital
costs are converted to current values (values of 2012 in the second cycle RBMPs) and the EAC is
Water 2018, 10, 1338 7 of 16
estimated based on the expected life-time of the infrastructure (n) and an annual discount rate of
r = 0.75% (centrally fixed by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, and Environment and
obtained upon historical depreciation criteria). This is the method used by the Guadalquivir RBA [17],
where total EAC of water services (up- and down-streams) used by the irrigation sector is obtained
upon de sum of the k individual EACi calculated for every water service facility (or infrastructure).
Global EAC =
k
∑
i=1
EACi =
k
∑
i=1
[
Capital costi
[
(1 + r)n × r
(1 + r)n − 1
]
+ O&M costi
]
(1)
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the use of historical depreciation criteria to calculate capital
costs (as part of financial costs) provides no guarantee of the recovery of capital replacement costs.
Therefore, by the time infrastructure elements become obsolete or fully depreciated, the flow of paid
charges during the life-time would never be enough to build new elements [7]. Although Spain has
been granted permission by the EC to use historical depreciation values for the determination of CR
rates, the issue of replacement costs has yet to be considered by the WFD.
Regarding the evaluation of environmental costs, there exist different methodologies, although
only a few of them have been fully applied at a river basin scale. Some examples can be found in
the existing literature [35,36]. Nevertheless, environmental cost valuation first requires clarification
of which environmental effects are to be considered and of the measures necessary to internalise
them [6]. Moreover, the internalisation of these external costs (e.g., deterioration of water quality
by agrochemical diffuse pollution) would imply identifying a compensation from the causing agent
(e.g., as a result of production or consumption decisions) to the affected agent (e.g., the society
as a whole) [37]. In the specific case of the GRB (and the rest of the Spanish RBDs), the existing
legal framework establishes that the valuation of environmental costs should focus on the economic
valuation of the damages caused, which is simplified by the cost of those measures to prevent/reduce
said damages. These measures are listed and evaluated in the PoMs (as accompanying report of the
RBMP). Thus, a cost-based approach is applied. This approach establishes that, while environmental
damage persist, environmental costs must be accounted for. Once damages disappear, then the
environmental costs convert into financial costs (all measured in EAC terms). At this point, it is worth
noting that this approach uses environmental protection costs as a lower-bound proxy for the costs
of external environmental damage, since benefits would generally compensate for the costs of the
measures related to environmental improvement [38]. Although this assumption is consistent in a
suboptimal state, where the cost of pollution abatement (protection cost) is always lower than the
benefit of reducing the damage (cost of damage), the cost-based approach is easier to implement by
decision-makers due to its better data availability. Theoretically, the optimum situation would be
reached when these two costs become equal.
Therefore, environmental cost associated to the irrigation sector in the GRB is estimated upon the
costs related to the necessary measures (as listed in the PoMs) to prevent or reduce the environmental
damages caused by irrigation (e.g., diffuse agrochemical pollution of surface and groundwater bodies).
Capital and O&M costs associated to this measure are used to estimate EACs, following a similar
method to that used in the case of financial costs (Equation (1)). Table 5 summarises the global financial
and environmental EACs related to agricultural water services in the GRB for 2012, as well as the
estimated CR rates. In the case of the GRB (as well as in Spain, as a whole), there are no policy
instruments specifically designed to recover those environmental costs directly related to agricultural
activities, such as water pollution taxes (e.g., on pesticides or fertilisers as introduced by Belgium,
Denmark and France) or water abstraction taxes designed to recover (at least partially) environmental
costs (as introduced in France and Portugal) [7]. Due to this fact, CR rates in all water services in
agriculture remain far from showing an adequate recovery of costs, regarding both financial and
environmental, thus being only partially financed by the revenues obtained from the instruments
summarized in Table 4.
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Table 5. Estimations of financial (F) and environmental (E) costs (total EACs) by water service and
CR rates.
Water Services Financial Costs (F)(Million €)
Environmental Costs (E)
(Million €) CR Rate
1
Up-Stream Services Regulated 47.5 7 0.60
Down-Stream
Services
Regulated 90.7 40.9 0.69
Non-regulated and GW 196.4 3.7 0.66
Recycled 4.0 3.9 0.48
Global 338.4 55.5 0.66 2
Note: Estimates for year 2012. 1 Including financial and environmental costs. 2 Weighted by served water. Source:
Authors’ own based on [17].
4.2. Assessment of Resource Cost and Cost Recovery
In the case of Spanish RBDs, the valuation of resource costs is either proxied by simple methods or
simply not considered. This subsection aims to offer a simple evaluation of resource costs in the case of
the GRB. Valuation of resource scarcity costs in monetary terms usually present both methodological
and empirical difficulties [7]. Additionally, the literature has mostly focused on the estimation of
environmental values related to water quality by overseeing quantitative aspects, such as those related
to resource (or opportunity) costs [39]. Though resource costs have generally not been analysed in
Spanish RBMPs, Art. 9 of the WFD clearly specifies the need for its estimation and recovery through
the use of alternative economic instruments, so that an efficient use (and allocation) of water resources
can be assured. Nevertheless, in river basins such as the GRB, characterised by a closure status
with total available water resources allocated and increasing pressure from competition between
various water users (including irrigated agriculture), the assessment of resource (or opportunity)
costs of alternative resource allocations seem especially necessary. Although the majority of Spanish
RBMPs have considered resource costs to be part of the environmental costs or have assumed them
to be zero [5], the last GRBMP attempts to offer a calculation around 2.2 million euros, which clearly
underestimates the real value, especially in a closed RB with increasing competition among alternative
users. In this respect, this study aimed to offer a simple alternative valuation of the resource cost of
water services in agriculture based on existing market prices of the resource, which may serve to offer
RBAs more realistic estimations of the resource costs associated to irrigation water uses.
Resource costs are associated with the economic value of the opportunities forgone when
allocating the resource to a given use [28], and thus they can be approached based on alternative water
valuation methods (e.g., residual value) or market prices, which should be netted of the costs incurred
by abstracting and moving the water from one use to its final destiny [7]. Despite methodological
shortcomings, various methods can be used in our specific case study, as there is available information
regarding water transfer prices within the GRB and RBs nearby in Spain [40] [41], estimations of
irrigation water values following the residual value method [42], and regarding apparent productivity
values [30]. Specifically, the proposed method aims to offer an estimation of the resource cost based on
transfer prices.
Although the ranking of priorities established in the GRB (domestic vs. economic uses, including
irrigation) limits water trade, thereby implying that most transfer agreements have occurred within
the agricultural sector, other economic sectors (e.g., hydropower and industry) could also participate
as trading agents [33]. Table 6 summarises the latest evidence regarding agreed water prices in water
transfers or sales (both intra- and inter-basin) and water banks in Spain for irrigation purposes. Most
water exchanges of this type took place during the drought period of 2005–2008, and hence prices
have been brought up-to-date to 2012 (fourth column in Table 6). The average price is 0.21 €/m3,
which is close to the updated price of the last inter-basin water transfer between the GRB and the
Mediterranean Andalusian RB in 2008 with a sale price of 0.18 €/m3 (apart from the transfer costs of
0.13 €/m3 for the use of the Negratín-Almanzora transfer facility).
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Table 6. Evidence on prices of water sales and water banks in Spain.
Intra-Basin Water Transfers Year Price (€/m3) Price (2012)
Mediterranean Andalusian RB 2007 0.15 0.16
Segura RB 2012 0.22 0.22
GRB to Mediterranean Andalusian RB 2006–2008 0.18 0.20
Tagus RB to Segura RB 2008 0.22 0.24
Water banks
Júcar RB 2008 0.25 0.27
Segura RB 2008 0.17 0.18
Average 0.21
Source: Authors’ own based on [40,41].
In recent years, inter-basin transfers for irrigation purposes from the GRB to the Mediterranean
Andalusia RB through the Negratín-Almanzora transfer facility have commonly taken place, and the
administrative transfer cost has remained mostly unchanged: currently set at 0.13 €/m3 (this price
is set to cover all financial costs of the transfer facility). These transfers are administratively limited
to an annual maximum of 50 Hm3 for the irrigation of approximately 24,000 hectares, and therefore
permitted transfers have varied depending on the hydrological reserves of the GRB, whereby no
transfers are allowed when water reserves fall below 30% of the GRB storage capacity. Although
during drought periods transfers have not been permitted, users have been able to negotiate water
sales under special authorisation of the RBA. In December 2006, Aguas de Almanzora (a consortium of
18 irrigator associations located in the Mediterranean Andalusian RB) bought rice farms in downstream
GRB to acquire water-use rights and transfer that water to irrigate horticulture crops and citrus trees
in the Mediterranean Andalusian RB [40]. Since buyer and seller were the same, no sale price was
set (except for the transfer costs of 0.13 €/m3). Nevertheless, the purchase price for the rice farms
(24,000 €/ha) implied a water cost equivalent to 0.18 €/m3 [43]. This cost is similar to additional water
purchases carried out by Aguas de Almanzora, who in 2007 and 2008 bought water from various
IWUAs in the GRB. In those operations, the sale price was set at approximately 0.18 €/m3 (similar
to that paid in 2006) [40]. This price, updated to 2012, will be used as a trading value to estimate
the resource cost in the GRB (0.20 €/m3). The proposed method can therefore be summarised in the
following postulations:
(a) Water used by agriculture in down-stream services is used for the estimate. By means of omitting
the simultaneous inclusion of up-stream and down-stream services, double accounting of the
costs is avoided. Additionally, the use of down-stream services enables groundwater use by
agriculture to be accounted for in the overall estimation.
(b) Estimation of the resource cost should be estimated considering the specific characteristics of
the GRB, thereby taking as reference values those set by trading prices agreed in the context of
the GRB. Specifically, the sale price of the latest inter-basin transfer from the GRB for irrigation
purposes set at 0.20 €/m3 (in prices of 2012) has been considered.
(c) A proxy of the resource cost can be obtained upon the difference (or additional cost) between
current cost paid by the irrigation sector and the price that this sector would be willing to
pay in the case of resource scarcity (around 0.20 €/m3) multiplied by the served water in each
down-stream water service (Table 7).
Based on these postulations, a simple assessment of the resource cost in the GRB is offered in
Table 7. Total resource costs would be around 269 million euros, where surface water use for irrigation
would account for approximately 77% of total cost. In the case of the use of recycled water, no resource
cost would be applicable. Full cost recovery of resource cost would mean an increase of around
0.08 €/m3 (269 million €/3264 hm3), well above previous estimations although it would depend on
the down-stream service considered [39,43]. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that this estimation
attempts to serve as only a proxy of the resource cost in the GRB regarding agricultural water use, and
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where the method used is just one of the multiple methods that can be used. Additionally, full cost
recovery of resource cost should be carefully considered since it would be controversial to transfer it
directly to irrigation tariffs, either for effectiveness [44] or social [45] reasons. This point will be further
discussed in the subsequent section.
Table 7. Estimation of resource cost in the GRB.
Down-Stream Current Cost(€/m3)
Additional Cost
(€/m3) 1
Served Water
(hm3) 2
Resource Cost
(Million €) 1×2
Regulated 0.098 0.102 2061 210
Non-regulated and GW 0.15 0.05 1188 59
Recycled 0.24 n.a. 15.4 n.a.
Total - - 3264 269
Note: Estimates for 2012. Source: Authors’ own. 1: Additional Cost; 2: Served Water (hm3).
Once the resource cost has been estimated, global cost-recovery rates (including financial,
environmental and resource costs) for irrigated agriculture in the GRB can be obtained (Table 8).
Results show that CR rates fall below 0.5 if resource cost is considered. As discussed further in
the subsequent section, these results may carry major policy and social implications. Nevertheless,
the application of the CRP, as defined by the WFD, does not mean the achievement of full cost recovery
in all water services and sectors, since exceptions can be widely used by MS based on sufficient
justification. For this reason, complete and adequate assessments of all costs related to the provision of
water services, including environmental and resource costs, should be addressed in RBMPs regardless
of the CR rate achieved, the application of sufficient recovery cost instruments, and/or the existence
of justified exceptions. Additionally, cost transparency and societal knowledge regarding the degree
of agricultural subsidisation in the use of water resources would be better addressed in RBMPs, in
accordance with the WFD policy principles.
Table 8. Global cost-recovery rate by water service.
Water Services CR Rate
Up-stream services Regulated 0.60
Down-stream services
Regulated 0.27
Non-regulated and GW 0.51
Recycled 0.48
Global 0.44 1
Note: Estimates for 2012. 1 Weighted by served water. Source: Authors’ own.
5. Discussion and Policy Implications
The value of water to society clearly goes beyond its simple valuation as a productive input
(e.g., in irrigated agriculture) [46]. Nevertheless, a more complete knowledge of all costs related to
the agricultural use of water resources doubtless brings more transparency to society and for policy
analysis [7]. Although not all costs related to the provision of water services can be recovered, as for
instance those related to flood and drought prevention cannot be assigned to a specific economic
use [33], the application of the principle of cost recovery in all water services requires the assessment
of all costs addressed by the WFD, including financial, environmental and resource costs [2]. The CRP
is accepted as a primary principle in EU water policy and, based on the concept of water services, its
application is directly related to the achievement of the environmental objectives set by the WFD [23].
In this sense, the selection of measures in RBMPs (and PoMs) to restore the “good status” in all
bodies of water provide important information for the design of cost-recovery instruments (e.g., water
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pricing, eco-taxes, etc.). However, across the EU, very few RBMPs contain a plausible description of
all economic costs (financial, environmental and resource costs) related to agricultural water use [22].
In this respect, the European Commission has asserted that there has been a lack of determined action
in most MS to address the costs of water services used by the agricultural sector, since those in charge
of the design and implementation of RBMPs (e.g., RBAs and regional governments) do not have full
legislative power to enforce implementation of the CRP [2,47]. Furthermore, the lack of political will in
central and/or regional governments to dismantle the traditional subsidy-based agricultural systems
is usually caused by social considerations [5,8]. Specifically, the reluctance to increase water irrigation
charges (and thus, CR rates) in Spain has normally been defended on two bases: (a) the existence of
public services provided by agriculture in terms of food security and environmental benefits; and (b) a
sector competitiveness issue, since farmers’ costs would otherwise dramatically increase.
With respect to the first argument, the application of the CRP to agriculture does not necessarily
imply the abolition of subsidies received by the agricultural sector as provider of public goods and
services, such as maintenance of rural landscapes and preservation of habitats and ecosystems in
rural environments [48]. An ideal policy mix would utilize separate instruments to compensate
agriculture for the benefits and to penalize for the drawbacks [46], thus balancing between an adequate
cost recovery based on fiscal charges (e.g., water charges and pollution taxes) and compensation for
ecosystem services provided by agriculture [7]. Furthermore, differences among different types of
agriculture (e.g., traditional vs. commercial) need to be considered in this balance. In this context,
the sufficient contribution of agriculture to cover all costs associated to its use of water resources
would no longer remain a controversial issue, as it would be perfectly acceptable for efficiency and
equity reasons.
Nevertheless, various studies have established a clear connection between agricultural subsidies
and the increase of irrigated agriculture, which increases the pressures on water resources [45,49,50].
Spanish irrigation modernisation programs have generally encouraged changes in the crop-mix
towards high-value crops (citrus, horticulture, etc.), even though intensive irrigated agriculture
constitutes the main cause of degradation (both qualitative and quantitative) of surface and
groundwaters [10,31]. Public subsidies for the modernisation of irrigation schemes have generally
implied a reduction of the cost recovery rates [51]. Additionally, the EU Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) supported the development of agriculture of a more profitable (and input-intensive) nature until
its reform in 2013, which enlarged the cross-compliance system between the receipt of subsidies and the
respect for a set of environmental goals (including water-quality issues) [52]. Nevertheless, and despite
the advances in last decade, the coordination of the CAP and water environmental policies still needs
to be further improved to achieve a more sustainable use of water resources [20,53]. This might also
require a reformulation of the CRP to account for external environmental costs of irrigated agriculture,
for the implementation of innovative recovery cost instruments to finance the foreseen environmental
measures in the PoMs [54], and for the revision of exceptions and greening standards set in the CAP
with respect to agricultural water use [14].
Regarding sector competitiveness, it seems clear that higher water prices will inevitably increase
costs at farm level. In this respect, some studies (e.g., [7]) argue that the share of water in total farm costs
is not highly significant (e.g., in average terms, water cost represents less than 2% of cultivation costs in
Spain) and that innovative management and technology will enable farmers to generate greater value
per irrigation water unit. In contrast, other studies have shown that higher irrigation water charges
would result in negative effects for low-productive farmers and those with no power to translate costs to
crop prices [55–57]. Thus, traditional (and less-profitable) agricultural exploitations would need special
measures to guarantee their economic viability (e.g., through financial compensation for the provision
of ecosystem services to society). Conversely to the household sector, where certain studies have
defined threshold cost (or water-poverty) levels [58,59], no defined criteria exist for the assessment
of cost-increase affordability among agricultural water users. Only the OECD [7] has proposed
the concept of “sustainable cost recovery” for the agricultural sector, based on a limited financial
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sustainability in the provision of water services (and therefore fails to consider environmental and
resource costs). Along these lines, [60] argue that irrigated olive farmers in the GRB would be willing to
pay higher water prices based on an increase in reliability of irrigation supply, up to 0.07 €/m3 (which
is close to our estimated increase for resource cost recovery). Other studies (e.g., [7,61,62]) argue that
pricing policies may have no significant impact on overall income distribution for agriculture, although
they may negatively affect certain groups, such as small and low-productive farmers. In this respect,
several studies argue that equity and distributional effects could be minimized through water-pricing
schemes with increasing block tariffs, together with rural development policies aimed at aiding specific
low-value and subsistence farming [3,63,64]. Additionally, those new financial resources could be
invested in measures for the improvement of supply reliability, irrigation modernisation programs,
renewal of irrigation infrastructure, and rural development measures (e.g., financially reinforcing the
CAP second pillar), thereby enhancing the willingness to pay among benefitting farmers.
In this respect, several EU countries, such as France and the Netherlands, have created special levies
(or eco-charges) on irrigation water use, both for surface and groundwater abstraction, in an attempt to
internalise environmental and resource costs [7]. In general, the level of cost recovery achieved by these
levies has been low due to its low rates (around 0.003 €/m3 in France), which has led to its abolishment in
the case of the Netherlands. Portugal has recently introduced a water abstraction charge (of approximately
0.004 €/m3), designed to guarantee certain contribution of the irrigation sector to internalise part of the
resource cost, and not with the objective of a full cost recovery. Other countries, such as Spain, are debating
whether to implement this type of eco-tax. In this respect, [56] argued that the introduction of an eco-tax
(of around 0.02 €/m3) in Spain would help to achieve both a higher contribution of the irrigation sector to
cover water service costs and the resources needed to adequately fulfil the WFD environmental objectives.
Nevertheless, this study recommends that this increase in irrigation charges be followed by measures
aimed at avoiding negative effects on impoverished rural areas. A simple calculation in the case of the
GRB based on the estimated environmental costs (55.5 Million Euros in Table 5) and water served for
irrigation purposes (3264 Hm3 in Table 7) yields an average environmental cost of 0.02 €/m3 (similar to
that proposed in [56]). In our opinion, this would help to internalise the environmental costs associated to
the irrigation sector. Again, it is worth mentioning that the application of exceptions is always possible,
and depends on the social, environmental, and economic effects of the cost-recovery instrument used, as
well as on the geographic and climatic conditions of the specific area or region. However, any exemption
needs to be sufficiently justified and has to be shown not to detract from the environmental objectives of
the WFD [5].
The question therefore remains: is this exceptional treatment, regarding the application of
the CRP to irrigated agriculture, sustainable in the future? Many policy makers still believe so
for the aforementioned reasons and for the way that subsidies are seen as a way to guarantee
fairness and efficiency in Spanish and European agricultures [14,65]. Nevertheless, Spanish society
is becoming more reluctant to subsidise economic sectors that impose external costs to current and
future generations. Additionally, an increase in the internalisation of water costs by the irrigation
sector (albeit partially) does not run contrary to the establishment of compensations for agriculture
environmental services and rural development, but against indiscriminate cost subsidising and the
absolute lack of the internalisation of environmental and resource cost. European authorities are
insisting on the need for pricing measures of a more transparent and incentivising nature in the
irrigation sector, and a move towards similar treatment as received by other economic sectors [27,64].
Moreover, a fair and incentivised pricing system may provide the resources necessary to finance the
measures aimed at achieving a “good” status in all those water bodies affected by agricultural pressure,
without endangering the provision of agricultural and rural benefits to society.
6. Conclusions
The CRP is considered by the EU water policy to be a substantial requirement for economic
efficiency, transparency, fairness, and sustainability in the use of water resources. On the one hand,
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this paper has analysed the application of the CRP to the agricultural irrigation sector, as a water
service beneficiary, in Spain through the assessment of the GRB case study. Our results indicate that,
although financial and environmental costs are assessed in the current RBMP, no formal assessment of
the resource (or scarcity) costs is carried out, as remains the case for all Spanish RBDs. Furthermore,
the evaluation of financial and environmental costs carried out in the current GRBMP register several
shortcomings, which have been highlighted in this study. Estimated cost recovery rates are generally
low in all water services used by the irrigation sector. Further efforts should therefore be made to
adequately estimate the costs of water services used by the irrigation sector so a higher economic
efficiency, transparency, fairness, and sustainability in the use of water resources can be achieved.
Additionally, this study offers a much-needed discussion about the agricultural “exceptionalism”
phenomenon regarding the application of the CRP to water services. This “exceptionalism” applies to
other primary principles of EU water and environmental policy, such as the Polluter Pays Principle
(which lies beyond the scope of this paper). The main arguments against full application of the CRP to
irrigated agriculture are based on the justification through the existence of public services provided by
agriculture and the sector’s competitiveness. As discussed in this paper, these two arguments are not
necessarily in opposition to the application of the CRP.
Finally, an assessment of financial, environmental and resource costs related to the irrigation
sector is necessary to determine the appropriate cost-recovery measures and the exemptions deemed
acceptable by society. The current process of the third-cycle RBMPs represents an ideal means to gain
transparency, equity, and efficiency in the way the irrigation sector uses water resources; all this when
EU water and agricultural policies are also under review in order to guarantee the most sustainable
development of agriculture on using such a strategic natural resource.
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